Russia's War: A History of the Soviet Effort: 1941-1945

Russia's War is far from a tale of triumph, as the Russian capacity for resourceful creativity, desperate courage, and raw endurance was matched, if not exceeded, by the brutal oppression of the Soviet system. Overy argues, however, that victory was the result of precisely this uneasy combination. Drawing from extensive archival sources made available in the wake of glasnost, he revises both our conception of the Red Army as a horde that overwhelmed the Germans and the accepted wisdom that Hitler's defeat was the result of strategic bungling and a logistical overreach of the Nazi forces. Perhaps his most poignant contribution is the discussion of the crisis that recent disclosures have provoked in the Russian understanding of the conflict. What was once viewed by the Soviets as the "Great Patriotic War" has become "a crucible of miserable and incomprehensible revelations." In spite of these confusions, Russia's War commences to find significance in a contest that repeatedly disquiets and humbles the historical imagination. --James Highfill

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0 of 0 people found the following review helpful:

Excellent overview, 2008-10-03
It could have used a little bit more meat, but considering the epic scale of the conflict, understandable. Overall a great reference source for an overview.


1 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

Foremost Cause of Soviet Victory: Stalin , 2008-07-14
Once the Soviet Union fell in 1991 and the era of Glasnost arrived it was inevitable that western historians would seek to re-appraise the eastern front in the Second World War. One of the early efforts was Russia's War, written by British historian Richard Overy. He used some of the early released information to re-examine our knowledge of the Russo-German War and to attempt to explain just how the Soviet Union was able to defeat what appeared to be the strongest military power on earth. Readers should be aware that this book is not a blow-by-blow campaign history but rather, a book that uses thematic-based chapters to chart the course of Soviet victory. Furthermore, this book has already been dated by further research into Soviet wartime records by historians such as the prodigious David M. Glantz; for example, there is no mention of the disastrous 1942 Operation `Mars.' Overall, this book is a useful supplement to Glantz's own one-volume summary of the war, When Titans Clash, since it touches on elements affecting Soviet power that Glantz (who is strictly focused on military issues) omits.

Russia's War is divided into ten chapters, consisting of 330 pages of text and 36 pages of endnotes. The author also provides 11 sketch maps and 3 tables, as well as 32 very dark and blurry B/W photos. The author states his hypothesis up front when he says that, "material explanations of Soviet victory are never quite convincing" and opines that one cannot account for Soviet victory without addressing the idea of a Russian soul or spirit. Instead, he seeks to demolish the stereotype that Soviet victory was simply the product of overwhelming numerical superiority.

The first chapter deals with the creation of the Stalinist state in the USSR during the interwar period and Stalin's pre-occupation with building up the Soviet Union against both internal and external attack. Overy notes that Stalin's forced collectivization - always condemned outright in the West - made a huge demographic shift from rural areas to the cities, which made possible the industrial programs of the 1930s. In short order, Stalin transformed Russia from a primarily agrarian economy to a nation of heavy industries, which provided the basis for industrial mobilization in 1941-45. The author concludes that, "without the economic transformation, the Red Army would have been a feeble force in 1941, relying on a vast base of peasant manpower." Although Overy also discusses the impact of Stalinist purges on the Soviet military, he believes that they have been exaggerated and that, the Red Army `had severe weaknesses both before and after the purges," such as very weak command and control due to lack of radios and the interference of political commissars.

The next several chapters are rather disappointing. Chapter two deals with the lead-up to war in 1937-41 but skims over Soviet military modernization efforts as well as Khalkin-Gol and the Russo-Finnish War. Chapters three and four deal with Operation Barbarossa and Soviet efforts to defend Leningrad and Moscow but really don't offer any new material. Overy does conclude that, "it was not the tough winter conditions that halted the German army but the remarkable revival of Soviet military manpower after the terrible maulings of the summer and autumn," but contends that these actions were not decisive. In the fifth chapter, on terror and resistance, Overy crosses over an old `taboo' line by mentioning the active cooperation of thousands of Cossacks with the invading Germans and states that, "an estimated one million Soviet soldiers ended up fighting against their country." These comments are important but exaggerated, since Vlasov's army was not formed until 1945 and most other units formed from eastern volunteers were only battalion or regiment-sized. The author also assails the cherished icon of Soviet partisans, stating that their role was fairly limited and describes them as "the kamikazes of the Soviet war effort."

On a number of issues, Overy seems unable to drag himself out of the morass of Soviet wartime propaganda. For example, he claims that virtually all of the German troops involved in the Korsun Pocket breakout in February 1944 were `massacred' - essentially parotting Soviet wartime claims - while fresh research reveals that 35,000 out of 45,000 Germans escaped the pocket. Similarly, Overy's treatment of Soviet inactivity during the uprising of the Polish Home Army is August 1944 is as insulting as it is faulty.

In the sixth and seventh chapters, the author covers the critical battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, considered the decisive actions. He notes that the combination of Stalin's `not-a-step-backward' order and ferocious Soviet propaganda brought Soviet society "to a fever pitch of hatred and vengeance" in 1942, which contributed to the Red Army's victory at Stalingrad. In the Kursk chapter, he cites Stalin's willingness to gradually give more decision-making authority to his military professionals, which contrasted greatly with Hitler's move in the opposite direction and that this, "created a central team of military managers and thinkers which radically altered Soviet fighting power." With Soviet industry churning out large numbers of modern tanks, artillery and aircraft, a revitalized Soviet military elite was allowed to plan and conduct its campaigns based on military rather than political logic. Overy also cites other factors that contributed to Soviet victory: two thirds of women were drafted to work in factories while most German women stayed at home; Western Lend-Lease provided the Soviets with vital non-combat gear (radios, trucks, boots), allowing Soviet industry to concentrate on weapons production; and the role of slave-labor in the Soviet Gulgag, which produced 15 percent of all ammunition. Overall, Professor Overy concludes that Soviet victory was based on a combination of factors, but the foremost were the series of brutal policies enacted by Stalin that made the Soviet Union a far more militarized state than the old Tsarist Russia. While this book made an important contribution when it first appeared over a decade ago, it is becoming obsolete and should be used with care.



13 of 13 people found the following review helpful:

Russia's War, 2007-11-22
`Russia's War' is a riveting, fact-filled history of the Russian experience in WW2. British historian, Richard Overy takes the reader first through the pre-war years in Soviet Russia, and continues with a chronological account of the war on the eastern front. This is a military as well as a political history. Not only does he thoroughly describe all the major battles such as Barbarossa, Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Kursk, and Berlin, but he also highlights the internal workings of the Soviet state from it's inception until the end of the war. The terror, collectivization, consolidation of power by Stalin and the Bolsheviks, the gulag system, the role of the NKVD, relations with the western allies, and the general plight of the average Russian under communism are all explained in detail. The book is ten years old, but the only implication would be to consider that new information is continuously being released from once secret Soviet archives, thus a few minor details could be subject to change.

I've always taken for granted the fact that the Red Army was every bit as cruel as the Wehrmacht, and that the entire Soviet state was just as "bad" as the Nazi state. The NKVD in particular, was guilty of unspeakable atrocities-on their own people as well as their enemies-that make Abu Ghraib look like a day at Disneyland. There seems to be a significant group of people who resent this comparison though, and would have us believe that Stalin, and by extension the whole Bolshevik movement, was somehow morally superior to Hitler's invading armies. Richard Overy knows better. This is not to say that the intent of `Russia's War' is to demonize the Red Army in any way; in fact it is an excellent example of objective history that duly describes the positive and negative characteristics of the Soviet war machine. In regards to fighting ability and effectiveness, Overy actually gives much more credit to the Red Army than many previously have. He's skeptical of the conclusion that the Russian victory was merely a result of more plentiful resources and numerical superiority, and describes how the Red Army dramatically improved their tactical and strategic effectiveness as the war went on. This evolution, according to Overy, together with the well-known tenacity and fanatical resistance of the Russian soldier, is what won the war on the eastern front. That being said, the American Lend-Lease program is also described as a much bigger contributor than the Soviets admit.

The book appropriately ends on the note of Stalin's legacy and his cult of personality. Although Overy praises his skill as political and military strategist, he describes the horrific consequences of his paranoid and vengeful mentality. Despite the brief glory and jubilation of the immediate post-war victory, the plight of the Russian people under Stalin became even worse after the war, as Stalin plunged the country into a "second dark age." Overy really captures the enormous sacrifice and suffering of the Russian people. As someone who has little sympathy for anything Soviet, I have to concede a grudging respect for the Russian people in this regard. He is also convincing in describing how the Red Army is primarily responsible for the defeat of Nazi Germany, a fact that the Russians felt was not properly acknowledged by their allies in the west. Overall, although some of his conclusions are certainly debatable, his general analysis and description of events is outstanding. So if you are looking for a concise, objective work on the Soviet experience in WW2, look no further than `Russia's War.' Five stars.


5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

The Forgotten Front, 2007-05-19
The Soviet defeat of the Nazi war machine was a vital element in the outcome of World War II. In fact, the Eastern front might have been the factor in the destruction of Nazi Germany. The majority of the German Army was deployed against the Soviets not the western allies.
The Soviets, however, have not received the credit they deserve. German Generals blamed the defeat on Hitler's strategic mistakes. This claim amounts to assertion that the Soviets did not win this war as much as Germany lost it. In the West historians adopted this argument as their own and claimed that the Soviets overwhelmed the Germans with sheer numbers. The Soviets were unwilling to refute this view since they might use tactics and strategies in a war with NATO similar to the ones they used against the Germans. They had no reason to share their secrets with the enemy.

Much has changed since the end of the Cold War. Historians have gotten access in part to Soviet records. Richard Overy, one of the leading historians of World War II, has written an impressive summary of the new findings of the last ten years. Overy gives his readers a well-written account that manages to cover its broad subject in clear fashion. One of the strengths of this text is that the author is able to give the reader an understanding of the savage nature of combat in this theater without being overwhelming.

The Russians won this war and the Communist system and its leader, Josef Stalin, were vital elements in the victory. The Soviet Union survived the Nazi invasion and went on to win because the USSR kept control of its industrial resources, kept factories in operation, found competent military leaders and reformed its armed services. Overy is on solid ground when he notes that had the Communists failed in these endeavors, there would have been no way for them to have resisted the Nazis. The Red Army became a competent, professional military during this war. The prewar purges hurt the Soviet military, but under the strains of repeated defeat, Stalin reduced his own involvement in military affairs and the command authority of political officers. Stalin was also smart enough to invoke traditional Russian values during the crisis of war. Religion flourished. Propaganda rarely mentioned Communism but instead called on the people to defend Mother Russia. The army brought back old military honors and decorations from the days of the Czars.

Overy has some interesting new points to make. Stalingrad was not the turning point in the war that so many others have seen. The Germans were able to make good the loss of men, and launch new offensives after this defeat. The Russians used their own weapons, but needed U.S. items like telephone wires, trucks, and radio equipment to fight their war. These items are hardly sexy or exciting, but they allowed the Red Army to become a mechanized force that could use firepower and mobility to destroy its enemy.

People interested in learning more about an important aspect of World War II will really like this book.



7 of 7 people found the following review helpful:

A slender introduction to a massive war, 2006-12-17
Richard Overy's occasionally chatty "Russia's War" is a useful introduction to the Great Fatherland War, but no more: It was the largest, though not the longest, war ever and can hardly be encompassed in just 330 pages.

The chattiness may derive from the book's function as a subsidiary to a 10-part television series. In any event, the anecdotes, while always interesting, seem to have been chosen at random, as if to break up, briefly, an often grim text.

Overy takes advantage of revelations available since the late 1980s, which do not in any important way change the history of the conflict as it was understood earlier. They merely refine and quantify, perhaps more accurately, perhaps not, a conflict of superlatives. For example, estimates of the dead in the Ukrainian famine of 1930-31 are reduced from a suspiciously round figure of 10 million to less than half that.

Inevitably, a good part of Overy's task is to specify and try to understand Josef Stalin's role. Stalin gets the benefit of all the many doubts and comes out as a great war leader. I remain unpersuaded. Russia did prevail, though, unlike Russia under the czar. Despite the wildly incompetent and inefficient Soviet system, in practice it was not quite as incompetent and inefficient as czarism.

One reason, though Overy does not explore this, is probably the incredible defensive power of the modern industrial state. Russia in 1914 was an industrial state -- its output of steel, coal and similar items ranked fourth or fifth in gross amounts -- but it was in every other respect premodern. Thus it could not benefit from its large industrial output. The Communists were modern, if inefficiently so, and perhaps that made the difference, rather than Stalin's abilities.

However that may be, there are some odd gaps in Overy's book. There is, for example, almost no mention of railroads.

More surprising, almost no mention of German losses. At some point in September or October 1941, while the Red Army was continuing to withdraw into the interior, the German casualty total passed the point of recovery and Russia had won. Nobody realized it at the time and few have understood it since.

In 1941, German losses in Russia came to nearly a million -- though you won't learn that from Overy -- thanks to stubborn resistance by the outclassed Russians. Yet the Germans had not gained any worthwhile objective in exchange. They might have, had the German strategy made any sense, although Russia's greatest advantage -- aside from General Winter and General Mud -- was the fact that nothing really important to the national existence resided in the western districts.

Overy misses this point and advances the defeat of Germany to late 1943 or even later. That this is incorrect was proven by the offensive of 1942, which the depleted Germans cut to half the frontage of 1941. If the full German army had been unable to achieve any important objectives in 1941, it was unlikely that half as much force could do so the next year.

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