by Milton Friedman, Anna Jacobson Schwartz
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Product Description
Writing in the June 1965 issue of theEconomic Journal, Harry G. Johnson begins with a sentence seemingly calibrated to the scale of the book he set himself to review: "The long-awaited monetary history of the United States by Friedman and Schwartz is in every sense of the term a monumental scholarly achievement--monumental in its sheer bulk, monumental in the definitiveness of its treatment of innumerable issues, large and small . . . monumental, above all, in the theoretical and statistical effort and ingenuity that have been brought to bear on the solution of complex and subtle economic issues." Friedman and Schwartz marshaled massive historical data and sharp analytics to support the claim that monetary policy--steady control of the money supply--matters profoundly in the management of the nation's economy, especially in navigating serious economic fluctuations. In their influential chapter 7, The Great Contraction--which Princeton published in 1965 as a separate paperback--they address the central economic event of the century, the Depression. According to Hugh Rockoff, writing in January 1965: "If Great Depressions could be prevented through timely actions by the monetary authority (or by a monetary rule), as Friedman and Schwartz had contended, then the case for market economies was measurably stronger." Milton Friedman won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2000 for work related to A Monetary History as well as to his other Princeton University Press book, A Theory of the Consumption Function (1957).
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Average Customer Review:
10 of 14 people found the following review helpful:
 One of the Top-10 Economics Books, 2006-03-25
MV=PQ (and other variations)
Monetary History of the United States is one of the greatest and most historic economics book written. Milton Friedman won the Nobel Prize in economics for this masterwork. It revolutionized economics. The only other book that is better is The Wealth of Nations by Adam Smith. I highly recommend both books.
At the time Monetary History was published, monetary economics had fallen out of favor because of the Great Depression. Economists had thought that monetary forces were ineffective as stimulating the economy in a severe downturn. The phrase "pushing up on a string" became famous. That led to the belief that government intervention of fiscal policy was always needed to keep the economy stable.
Friedman and Schwartz proved beyond a doubt that monetary forces contributed greatly to the Great Depression, contributed to the strong recovery under Franklin Roosevelt from 1933-1937, and caused the recession of 1937-38.
Monetary forces matter. Monetary History has never been effectively refuted, although Peter Temin did show that monetary forces were not the only cause of the Great Depression in his book Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression? The weakly regulated financial system collapsing so easily was partly to blame, as was the gold standard. The New Deal made the financial system stronger so it would not collapse again, and FDR removed America from the gold standard.
I highly recommend Monetary History. I also highly recommend Essays on the Great Depression by Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. The Great Depression is the ultimate riddle and they understand it.
9 of 24 people found the following review helpful:
A tremendous amount of work combined with a misspecified model, 2005-09-18
Friedman and Schwartz(1963)did a great deal of worthwhile data compilation.The problem(an identical problem occurs in the 1956 work of Philip Cagan) occurs when they attempt to fit the data to the standard quantity of exchange equation MV=PO,where M is the supply of money(Friedman always selects MI to be equal to M),V is the velocity,P is the price level,O is real GNP(GDP),and PO is nominal GNP(GDP).The correct specification of the equation of exchange is M(Vw)=PO,where w is defined on the unit interval between 0 and 1.w is Keynes's measure of the weight of the evidence or Ellsberg's (rho)measure of the confidence a decision maker has in the information set he will use to calculate the probabilities of different outcomes.Friedman is a lifelong adherent and advocate of the Ramsey-De Finetti-Savage subjective approach to probability which argues that ,while the existence of vagueness(J M Keynes's weight of the A Treatise on Probability(uncertainty of the General Theory) or Ellsberg's ambiguity)is undeniable,it can't be modeled in a decision theoretic context.Only risk,represented by a normal probability distribution and its mean+ or- 3 standard deviations,can be operationalized.Friedman's section 4 of chapter 12,titled "Expectations about Stability ",discusses exactly what Savage called vagueness,Keynes called uncertainty,liquidity preference being a function of uncertainty AND NOT RISK,AND ELLSBERG CALLED AMBIGUITY.Friedman has no variable in his model to deal with it.He admits this on the second paragraph of p.675.Friedman's analysis abstracts from the role that expectations,confidence,uncertainty,and the flexibility of money(Keynes's liquidity preference)play in the demand for money .All of the Friedman-Schwartz analysis needs to be redone using the correct specification of the equation of exchange.Friedman's existing specification only holds in the special case where w=1.0,i.e.,that there is no uncertainty,ambiguity,or vagueness. MV=PO is a correct specification of the equation of exchange only if risk,measured by the normal probability distribution's standard deviation(or the standard deviation divided by the mean),is the only decision theoretic variable.All current forms of the equation of exchange ignore ambiguity and/or uncertainty and conflate risk with uncertainty.The equation of exchange has been misspecified from Hume to Friedman and Lucas.Only Keynes correctly derived a generalized equation of exchange.Keynes's analysis is contained on p.209 and chapter 21 of the GT.Lucas has already admitted that his framework of analysis breaks down completely if Keynesian uncertainty or Ellsbergian ambiguity prevents him from using his normal probability distribution.The massive 50 plus years of statistical analysis by Benoit Mandelbrot of data from all financial markets(stock,money,commodities,futures,currencies,bond) provides overwhelming empirical support for not using the normal distribution.Keynes,of course,would agree that, if the only decision theoretic variable of consequence is risk(Mandelbrot's mild risk),velocity would be stable or predictable.The fact that velocity is not constant or predictable means that Friedman's monetarism is only a very special case of Keynes's general theory,which,in terms of Mandelbrot's definitions,deals with mild and wild risk.Friedman can only deal with mild risk.
33 of 35 people found the following review helpful:
Classic in the canon of economic theory, 2005-03-07
Milton Friedman and Anna J. Schwartz' A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960 is an analysis and explanation of the Great Depression of the 1930s. Its conclusion, first published in the early 1960s, differs from the two main explanations that existed at the time.
Austrian Business Cycle Theory had argued that the Great Depression was caused by excessively loose monetary policy that fed an unsustainable economic boom during the 1920s, which eventually collapsed into depression. Friedman and Schwartz argued that instead it was excessively tight monetary policy following the boom of the 1920s that turned a run-of-the-mill recession into a depression. (For the Austrian explanation of the Great Depression, see Sir Lionel Robbins' The Great Depression or Murray Rothbard's America's Great Depression.)
Keynesianism argued that the Great Depression had been caused by insufficient consumer product demand and lack of investor confidence, and that government should compensate for this by increasing its spending and financing it with government debt. Friedman and Schwartz argued instead that the problem and solution were not so much a matter of fiscal policy as they were a matter of monetary policy. Government, particularly the monetary authorities, was the cause of the depression, not the solution. Stimulative fiscal policy as prescribed by Keynes would in the long run not lead to an increase in economic growth and employment, but only to an increase in inflation. (For the Keynesian explanation of the Great Depression, see John M. Keynes's The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money or John Kenneth Galbraith's The Great Crash, 1929.)
At the time of its publication, A Monetary History was not immediately accepted by the economics profession, which then was still dominated by Keynesian thinking. But when Keynesian theory could not explain the stagflation (recession combined with high inflation) of the 1970s, monetarism came to rule the day, and Friedman would go on to win the 1976 Nobel Prize in Economics.
Friedman and Schwartz's analysis has by now become the standard explanation for the Great Depression. In the very least, the book helped reestablish the importance of monetary over fiscal policy in the stabilization of the business cycle. Money matters, even if it is not the only thing that matters. In addition, the importance of the book was methodological, in that it emphasized the importance of the empirical testing of one's economic propositions. What makes the book so persuasive is the great lengths to which the authors go to sort out the causation behind the correlation-the causation, they found, ran from money to output and prices rather than vice versa or via a fourth variable.
A Monetary History is a classic work in the canon of economic literature. It is on occasion still reviewed in the literature (e.g. Journal of Monetary Economics, August 1994; Cato Journal, Winter 2004). It clearly is an academic work written for trained economists, making it perhaps less accessible to a general audience. But several highly readable summary versions of the book exist, such as chapter 3 of Milton and Rose Friedman's Free to Choose, and even a one-paragraph summary conclusion in Capitalism and Freedom (on p. 45 of the paperback edition), which was published around the same time as A Monetary History. Alternatively, ch. 13 ("A Summing Up", pp. 676-700) is reprinted in The Essence of Friedman.
22 of 65 people found the following review helpful:
 Hard to read, only for economists or wannabe economists, 2004-12-10
I hated this book because it's hard to read. I don't like wading through sentences as long as paragraphs full of obscure words that require a dictionary nearby.
I just wanted to get a general understanding of money and the Federal Reserve from a source I trust and admire - Milton Friedman. I don't mind facts and figures but I resent writing that forces me into hard labor to decipher the meaning. I think good writing is communicating in the simplest way possible, not in trying to impress the reader with the author's vocabulary and ability to construct impenetrable, wannabe-sophisticated, long, compound sentences.
Don't get me wrong, I'm an engineer and I've got a decent vocabulary and fairly decent language skills.
I've found the books by Murray N. Rothbard to be much easier to read than this book though not as easy to read as I would like. I'm still looking for the perfect monetary history/economics book. I hope there's one out there somewhere.
70 of 76 people found the following review helpful:
Negative Review Missed the Very Point of the Book, 2003-08-20
I read the reviews and found them helpful, but the unnamed reviewer that attributed the Great Depression to causes totally other than this book cites, and bashed Friedman as "not having a leg to stand on" concerned me because it seems the reviewer missed the very point of the book. Nobel prize winning economist Milton Friedman and his co-author undertook the monumental work of tracing money supply for each year for nearly a century. In doing so, they did the staggering amount of work required to show all of us something very powerful. To say they don't have a leg to stand on is disconcerting because it seems to indicate a review without a reading, or at least understanding. Obviously the Great Depression was the result of of complex interactions within the economy. What Friedman tries to do is show us the EMPIRICAL evidence for interaction between a contracting money supply and a worsening economic situation, and a steady money supply and a bettering economic situation. The Great Depression may have come about because of arrogant decisions and cascading failures, and those who decided to contract the money supply evidently were a very important trigger. I can say "evidently" because Friedman's research gives us the chance to observe the evidence for ourselves. To have advanced our knowledge of economics in a practical way, to have given useful facts for fending off depressions, is a gift. That's why this book will remain a watershed work in the history of economics.
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