Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 (Modern War Studies)

Doubler portrays a far more capable and successful American fighting force than previous historians--notably Russell Weigley, Martin Van Creveld, and S.L.A. Marshall--have depicted. True, the GIs weren't fully prepared or organized for a war in Europe and have often been viewed as inferior to their German opponent. But, Doubler argues, they more than compensated for this by their ability to learn quickly from mistakes, to adapt in the face of unforseen obstacles, and to innovate new tactics on the battlefield. This adaptability, Doubler contends, was far more crucial to the American effort than we've been led to believe.

Fueled by a fiercely democratic and entrepreneurial spirit, GI innovations emerged from every level within the ranks--from the novel employment of conventional weapons and small units to the rapid retraining of troops on the battlefield. Their most dramatic success, however, was with combined arms warfare--the coordinated use of infantry, tanks, artillery, air power, and engineers--in which they perfected the use of air support for ground operations and tank-infantry teams for breaking through enemy strongholds.

Doubler argues that, without such ingenuity and imaginative leadership, it would have been impossible to defeat an enemy as well trained and heavily fortified as the German army the GIs confronted in the tortuous hedgerow country of northern France, the narrow cobblestoned streets of Aachen and Brest, the dark recesses of the Huertgen Forest, and the frigid snow-covered hills of the Ardennes.

Marking the 50th anniversary of the American victory in the Battle of the Bulge, Doubler offers a timely reminder that "the tremendous effects of firepower and technology will still not relieve ground troops of the burden of closing with the enemy." As even Desert Storm suggests, that will likely prove true for future high-tech battlefields, where an army's adaptability will continue to be prized.

This book is part of the Modern War Studies series.

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All Customer Reviews
Average Customer Review:
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

Well written, well argued, 2007-12-12
Michael Doubler argues that the US Army in World War II was more effective than it is often portrayed. After learning some basics in North Africa and Italy, the Army developed true combined arms tactics starting in Normandy, and due to the Army's decentralized nature, successful ideas spread throughout the whole organization. Hedgerow assault tactics developed in several divisions in Normandy and quickly spread throughout the whole army, allowing the Allies to break the deadlock. Close air support techniques as effective as any of the war were pioneered by IX TAC. Tactics for assaulting fortifications and crossing rivers developed contrary to doctrine, as doctrine was seen more as a rough guideline rather than something to be strictly followed. The book is well written and difficult to put down at times, giving an excellent discussion of tactics and tactical development. The author makes his case as convincing as it perhaps can be made. This is why the book deserves 5 stars. Nevertheless, the book has some flaws and should be read only along with other viewpoints. Despite admitting to serious errors with the replacement system, supply, and operations, it seems that the author views the army through rose colored glasses, perhaps because he looks at the low levels of command. The high command was another matter. Except for tank destroyers, the book gives little insight into the flawed concepts of Leslie McNair and their effect on weaponry and tactics. McNair's ideas caused the inferiority of American tanks during the war, a topic not even touched on in the book. In fact, although the book gives a very good treatment of the infantry, the armored divisions are neglected, and I was left wanting more detail on the artillery. Overall, this book would be a valuable addition to your collection, but it should be read along with viewpoints to get a broader view.


1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

Closing with the Enemy, 2007-11-29
There are many good, solid pieces of information in this book. It was valuable in the descriptions of HOW the infantry and artillery joined forces in the ETO - the descriptions of actual methods were detailed and very informative. The only negative remark I have about this excellent book is that there was a lot of " in summary" information that was a bit tedious. Not enough to make the book unreadable, though, and not enough to keep anybody from buying it.


1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

How it was done, 2007-09-25
This is the most highly-detailed, concise book on WW2 American tactics that I have found. If your general impression from war movies and TV is that soldiers on both sides just sort of mill around out there, firing rifles and ducking for cover at random (mine, I confess), then you are in for a real education. This book is to that idea what grandmaster chess is to rock-paper-scissors. I would imagine this would be required reading in ROTC programs, and I have no doubt that anyone with a professional interest in the real craft of miltary operations would appreciate it. I'm a little less sure about the ordinary WW2 historical reader - it may tell you more than ever really wanted to know. I DO think it is worthwhile for any reader to absorb the author's primary contention about the US Army in WW2: It eventually developed thru trial-and-error into an excellent combat force at every level, winning thru smarts and technique. It did not just steamroll the outmanned opposition with too much of everything indifferently applied, as much conventional wisdom to this day suggests.


9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

A superior book for military professionals, 2005-01-14
This book is a superior work and is invaluable to the military professional interested in small unit tactics. COL Doubler has assembled exhaustive detail and provides a masterful analysis of the small unit tactics employed by the German Army and US Army in late WWII. He does so in a manner that is both easy to read and easy to extract: each chapter examines a specific tactical problem or environment. Read the whole thing and use it as a reference later. Military Historians will love it for the detail, but Military Professionals should read this book if they want to see a systematic discussion not only of WHAT the soldiers did, but why they did it that way and how it turned out. If you are an American Soldier add this book to your reading list: much of what you are taught is not tactics, but battle drills. Read this book and see how an earlier generation confronted seemingly insurmountable problems and solved them by thinking for themselves.


10 of 10 people found the following review helpful:

Informative, But Dry..., 2003-02-09
This is a highly informative book. Col. Doubler basically analyzes the obstacles faced by the GI's in the ETO and how they overcame them; bocage, fortifications, urban warfare, river crossings, the massacre in the Hurtgen Forest, the defense as used in the Ardennes and how the GIs made effective use of air support. Doubler states the possible problems, the possible doctrine the Army had at the time and how the GIs eventually found a solution.
His focus in this case is the American Army from June 6 1944 to May 8, 1945, the lessons learned in North Africa and Italy are dealt with only summarily, but Doubler's focus is on the ETO. He calls into question some of Russell Weigley's conclusions which he published in Eisenhower's Lieutenants, as well as Martin VanCreveld's opinions of Fighting Power. The GIs were adaptable and quick learners. They were much tougher than believed, and could improvise much better than the British or the Germans. If the enemy came upon a problem not covered by their manuals, they were usually helpless, not so the Americans.
The problem with the book is that each chapter reads like an article for a professional military man's magazine. His writing style is quite dry, so you won't get through this as you would say, like Stephen Ambrose or Peter Mansoor.

Still, an essential book on the GIs in Europe. Definitely worth the effort and time to read it.

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