2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
A Quest to Find Truth, 2005-05-31
As an ex-CIA polygraph examiner who served for four years in Vietnam, John Sullivan traveled throughout much of Indochina while performing lie detector tests in support of the US war effort. Over a quarter of a century later, Sullivan's memoirs tell the story of a man who, trained by a spy agency to unearth deceit, embarks upon a mission to a Cold War hotspot where he discovers deception and incompetence to be as perennial as the grass in the Vietnamese countryside.
While Sullivan makes it clear from the beginning that he did serve with a number of good men in Vietnam, he expresses astonishment at the degree of operational ineffectiveness (or just plain irresponsibility) on the part of many CIA personnel in Saigon Station and outer lying regions, which strangely enough became a backwater for 'problem' officers despite the country's exceptional strategic importance to US policy makers.
In reference to the author's tradecraft, Sullivan makes three worthwhile points about polygraph testing:
1) "Polygraph is about 92 percent art and 8 percent science."
2) "The fact that intangibles cannot be quantified or scientifically measured challenges the claim that polygraph is a science. I do not believe that it is possible to put a percentage on the reliability of polygraph testing, but under optimal conditions, it is very reliable."
3) Even if a subject registers as being deceptive on a polygraph, "unless an admission is obtained, the final determination is frequently what we refer to as a scientific wild-ass guess (SWAG)."
Although I would have enjoyed hearing more detailed discussions of Sullivan's expertise, I understand that there are limits as to how much can be openly discussed regarding his specialty. Nonetheless, this book scores a high mark in that it enables readers to walk away with a better understanding of both the Vietnam War as well as polygraph testing.
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
It takes a mosaic to tell a story this big - and personal, 2002-10-16
The book starts out one story at a time and some times the thought is "why tell me about a broken desk cover" but at the end you know more about what it was really like in Laos and Vietnam. John was known as the man who would tell the truth to those in power. Now he shares it with the rest of us.As we see the formulation of a new "homeland security agency" it is a reminder to us that the best way to get good results is pay attention to every step of the process. Our Vietnam operation had great support and many poor operations with the information results (even the good information) seeming to get lost on the way to those who needed it. The lesson I see is that all of the details are important. Bottle necks can kill.
6 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
Very Cursory, 2002-07-24
Many of the stories in the book are very light accounts of annoying conversations: personality conflicts. The author is apparently a real straight arrow and he has endless accounts of turns of phrase and trivial happenstances that annoyed him. Like the guy who switched his cracked desk glass for John's good one. Who cares, I mean literally? There is very little insight given to the interrogation process proper, which I was expecting because that is, after all, the author's specialty. In the end you have a sense that Vietnam was fill of corrupt, drunk spooks, and one lone shiny penny -- the author.
6 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
A "Must Read" for students of the Vietnam War, 2002-06-06
John Sullivan's "Of Spies and Lies" is a fascinating account of wartime CIA intelligence operations in Vietnam that should be required reading not only for students of the Vietnam War, but also for anyone interested in the current war on terror. John's discussions of the difficulties an intelligence agency faces in recruiting penetrations of a difficult and dangerous enemy organization and his descriptions of problems caused by the shortage of officers with the requisite language and area knowledge bear disturbing similarities to headlines we see in the press every day. It is another illustration of the old saw that "those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it."
John's book provides a unique window into life in the CIA's Saigon Station. His description of Agency operations in Vietnam ranges from the controversy surrounding our best penetration of the Viet Cong leadership to the polygraphing of local employees over the disappearance of a few slices of ham at a party (an incident I remember quite well). John also gives unprecedented insights into the important role the Agency's requirement for polygraph vetting plays in keeping case officers, who work daily in the murky waters of spies, fabricators, and con-men, on the straight and narrow road of the pursuit of the truth. CIA polygraphers like John helped lead the way in the development of a systematic vetting process for use in the conduct of clandestine intelligence collection operations. The book illustrates how that process works and how, when the process is ignored or distorted, the entire system can quickly break down.
I served with John in Saigon Station and know his reputation as one of the Agency's best. As a former Saigon Station officer, some of his criticisms of personnel and procedures in Southeast Asia are painful, but their accuracy is incontrovertible. I highly recommend this book.
3 of 7 people found the following review helpful:
An Outstanding Book by an Outstanding Man, 2002-06-04
As a history major who took courses on the Cold War in college, I can say with certainty that this book would be invaluable and highly instructive to anyone who reads it.
As an Intelligence Analyst I have come to appreciate the work case officers like John Sullivan have done in service of their country. This book should be required reading for all polygraphers and case officers.
As an officer in the military, I have come to realize that many of the lessons learned from Vietnam have been applied in today's armed services. The book points out low-points in the CIA that can be used to improve (if not already) current operations.
His style of writing makes it easy to follow, and allows the reader to get a good glimpse of CIA operations in Vietnam through the eyes of an honest, hard working, dutiful man.
Anyone who has any interest in Vietnam, whether for school, occupation, or hobby, must read this book to get the full picture.