by Tom Segev
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Product Description
From Israel’s leading historian, a sweeping history of 1967—the war, what led up to it, what came after, and how it changed everything Tom Segev’s acclaimed works One Palestine, Complete and The Seventh Million overturned accepted views of the history of Israel. Now, in 1967—a number-one bestseller in Hebrew—he brings his masterful skills to the watershed year when six days of war reshaped the country and the entire region.
Going far beyond a military account, Segev re-creates the crisis in Israel before 1967, showing how economic recession, a full grasp of the Holocaust’s horrors, and the dire threats made by neighbor states combined to produce a climate of apocalypse. He depicts the country’s bravado after its victory, the mood revealed in a popular joke in which one soldier says to his friend, “Let’s take over Cairo”; the friend replies, “Then what shall we do in the afternoon?”
Drawing on unpublished letters and diaries, as well as government memos and military records, Segev reconstructs an era of new possibilities and tragic missteps. He introduces the legendary figures—Moshe Dayan, Golda Meir, Gamal Abdul Nasser, and Lyndon Johnson—and an epic cast of soldiers, lobbyists, refugees, and settlers. He reveals as never before Israel’s intimacy with the White House as well as the political rivalries that sabotaged any chance of peace. Above all, he challenges the view that the war was inevitable, showing that a series of disastrous miscalculations lie behind the bloodshed.
A vibrant and original history, 1967 is sure to stand as the definitive account of that pivotal year.
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Average Customer Review:
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
 Leaves the reader with more questions than answers but still important, 2008-07-22
Mr. Segev has given readers another look into Israeli society and history. What I really liked about this book is how the author tackles the topic from all facets of Israeli society. He doesn't simply chronicle the decision making process among the leaders of Israeli society, but instead attempts to chronicle the story as seen by all Israelis. In doing so the author has written a psychological history as much as anything else.
By going through letters, diaries, newspaper headlines and combing through government archives Mr. Segev attempts to give the reader an inside look at what was happening with Israeli society before, during and immediately after the Six Day War. He uses soldiers diaries to give the reader a sense of what they were fighting for and what they thought. He uses correspondence between relatives in Israel and abroad to show the mood of the Israeli people. He writes of the elitism of
Ashkenazi and the impoverishment of the Mizrahi Jews. The feeling of gloom and failure of the Zionist dream seems almost palpable. The Zionist dream seems to have stalled after hitting the harsh realities. Israel's great leaders had gone into semi-retirement (although never really far from center stage). The recession on top of all the other real problems created a depressing mood on the eve of Israel's most resounding triumph. Mr. Segev does a great job detailing all of this, and he goes deep into the elites feelings and decision making process in the lead up to the war.
But I had some serious problems with some of the history presented here. During the lead up to war Segev paints a picture of indecision and fear among the ministers. He writes about all night ministerial cessions discussing the dangers of war. The reader gets a picture of a government besieged by their own generals demanding immediate action and enemies that surround them ready to crush Israel in a single blow. The military leaders pushing for action and insisting that every delay brings Israel that much closer to total annihilation. At the same time Israel's enemies are pushing for war. The problem I have is this is contrary to everything I have ever read on the situation, and in the book Mr. Segev gives readers hints to the false picture. He writes about a CIA man living in Israel who advises his Israeli neighbor on how to properly dig a trench in preparation for the oncoming war, but then tells the man there is no need in digging the trench since Israel will have won the war in a week anyways. He also writes about a U.S. assessment that basically gives the same time line. At one point he writes that Eshkol knew that the generals were exaggerating about the dangers they faced. Not only that but every account from Egyptian point of view I have read speaks of the fact that Nasser felt himself pushed into a war he couldn't win by the Syrians. Nasser knew he couldn't win which is why he made conciliatory offers such as allowing Israeli shipping to pass but without flying the Israeli flag.
What I don't understand is why did the U.S., Egypt and Jordan governments have intelligence assessments that had pretty good assessments of the situation but yet the Israeli government didn't. This is one problem with Segev's account. He portrays the government as indecisive and overly worried, but the military leaders are chomping at the bit to attack Egypt. I can see the near hysteria that might grip the average Israeli citizen, but why is Eshkol so worried at one moment but at the next he knows the generals are exaggerating the dangers. It makes no sense.
All in all this book is very deserving of the four stars I gave it despite some of the very real problems I had with the book. His description of the days after the Israeli victory and the euphoric feelings that swept through the Israeli nation is very good, and of the leaders almost criminal refusal to tackle the very real problems with the newly occupied territories and the people therein that has condemned future generations to constant strife is excellent . There decision to simply put off the question of how to handle these problems was negligent in the extreme.
I concur with a previous reviewer that this work has to be read in conjunction with other more comprehensive works, but this book has some strong merits of its own, and it is essential in getting a full picture of the Israeli perspective in this war. One more caveat, this was not a comprehensive work. It is written from the Israeli perspective only. This isn't a problem, but readers should be aware of this before getting into this book.
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
 One of the Best Books of 2007, 2008-02-19
Rated by the Economist Magazine as one of the best books of 2007, 1967: Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East provides exactly what it tries to provide, an insight into how the "Six Day War" affected Israel. I recommend this book to anyone who wants to gain a greater understanding of Israel and their view of the Middle East. This book also provides an inside look into Israeli politics now and then.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
 a noble effort, 2008-01-08
Segev is a journalist who writes history through the lens of journalism. So 1967 is an attempt to capture this spirit of journalistic history, as Segev quotes newspaper accounts, letters to the editors of various Israeli newspapers and periodicals, during the prelude, action and aftermath of the Six Day War. Segev uses a technique he perfected in One Palestine, Complete: taking certain set-historical characters, ordinary people and introducing them throughout the book at various stages. He also, as in his previous books, takes aim against Israeli leaders with characteristic venom: Eskol and Dayan, for instance, do not come out smelling like roses in 1967. As with nearly ever work about the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict, not everyone will be satisfied with Segev's conclusion (that the taking of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights did not add to Israeli's security, but detracted from it), and here, as in other places in the book, Segev may falter a bit in his historical logic.
1 of 12 people found the following review helpful:
 Vanity , all vanity , 2007-09-18
The author of this book proves that vanity of believing one can impose his categorical opinions unto history is nothing but vanity.
This is not "history," but rather his story and it's valid as such, and nothing else.
5 of 11 people found the following review helpful:
Less Than Meets The Eye, 2007-08-23
While from a historical perspective this is an excellent book, the author's prejudices and revisionist notions about the origins of the war and its consequences - largely a rehasing of leftist thoughts about the good Arabs caught by their leaders and the bad Israelis wanting war - get in the way. In the lead up to the war, he largely blames Israeli militarism for exacerbating tensions. While he gives some space to Russian meddling and misinformation through the Syrians, the author dwells on Israeli responses to Syrian incursions and sabre-rattling rather than the cause. It's sort of blaming the victim. After a while, the author becomes tedious. He does this with the capture of the Old City as well. He makes little of the bombardment of the New City of Jerusalem by the Jordanians and likes to contend that the Israelis used the war as an excuse for the capture of the West Bank. The author never mentions that the Arabs did not consider the Green Line anything more than a cease fire line existing only until the next war when they would achieve their never-ending hope of pushing the Israelis into the sea. The pro-Arab bias of the author gets so extreme that I stopped reading the book 100 pages before the end.
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