by Vladislav M. Zubok
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Product Description
Western interpretations of the Cold War--both realist and neoconservative--have erred by exaggerating either the Kremlin's pragmatism or its aggressiveness, argues Vladislav Zubok. Explaining the interests, aspirations, illusions, fears, and misperceptions of the Kremlin leaders and Soviet elites, Zubok offers a Soviet perspective on the greatest standoff of the twentieth century.
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Average Customer Review:
0 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
Much needed new research, 2008-12-19
We only had a short windown into the files of the Kremlin. With the new authoritarian regime on the rise under Putin, that's not likely to continue. Thankfully, Zubok has produced an excellent work using much of this newly available material. It turns out that the USSR really was an "evil empire" despite the fainting spells caused among the American intelligentsia when Reagan had the nerve to use the words.
5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
Excellent overview, 2008-10-11
This is an excellent book - a coherent, persuasive and well-written overview of the Soviet side of the Cold War. Zubok resurrects the "revolutionary-imperial paradigm" of his (and Pleshakov's) earlier book and extends it to the 1980s. The Soviet leaders, he argues, were motivated both by dreams of imperial aggrandizement and messianic revolutionary zeal. The thesis is well-made. I think on the whole Zubok's book chips away at the "revolutionary" part of the paradigm: the Soviet policy makers come across as rather cynical political operators, who carefully or sometimes unconsciously used ideological platitudes in pursuit of realpolitik aims. But that's just my reading of Zubok's own evidence. The book stands on familiar ground with regard to Stalin and Khrushchev; it does offer a remarkably vivid account of the Brezhnev and Gorbachev years. Brezhnev, dismissed in anecdotes as a senile fool manipulated by grey cardinals in his entourage, comes across as a real statesman, a peacemaker. Zubok's portrait of Gorbachev penetrates beyond the facade of naive idealism, revealing some of the layered complexity of the Gorbachev phenomenon. This is a must-read for anyone interested in post-war Soviet history.
3 of 5 people found the following review helpful:
Fine Book With Solid Scholarship, 2008-04-22
This is an excellent overview of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War. Judicious and fair, and drawing on much new information from the archives, one gets a sense that this will be the definitive work for some time. The only criticism I have is that I wish the author had dealt with the Sino-Soviet split in more depth. It is here, but only episodically brought in to the narrative. But all and all a great book and a fine read.
16 of 26 people found the following review helpful:
An excellent book about Soviet leadership during the Cold War, 2007-10-05
Like Melvyn Leffler, Zubok believes that Soviet decision making was constrained by ideology and personality. Zubok writes that ideology formed the basis for Stalins decisions regarding Germany. Stalin thought that his proposals for a neutral Germany and socialism in Eastern Germany would be enough for the Germans to flock to the Soviet cause. When this did not proved out to be true, Stalin militarized Eastern Europe for fear of a Western Germany with Western backing. Khruschev did not want to end the Cold War because he thought that Communism would eventually triumph and that he force the West to back down through the fear of nuclear war. Brezhnev implented detente because he feared war, but when he became ill, hard liners took over decision making and invaded Afghanistan. Gorbachev abandoned hardline Communist ideology and thought that a type of European Social Democracy would take over Eastern and this led to the Soviets leaving Eastern Europe in 1989. Hopefully Zubok along with Leffler and Tony Judt will get rid of the myth that Reagans's arm build up and hardline ideology was responsible for ending the Cold War.
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