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The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000

by Niall Ferguson

List Price:$30.00
Average Rating:4 out of 5 stars
Lowest New Price:$108.81

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Editorial Reviews
Product Description
Does money make the world go round, as Cabaret's Master of Ceremonies sang to us? In The Cash Nexus, acclaimed historian Niall Ferguson offers a radical and surprising answer-No.Conventional wisdom has long claimed that economic change is the prime mover of political change, whether in the age of industry or the Internet. In our own time Paul Kennedy has claimed that economics provided the key to international power, while Francis Fukuyama and others have argued that capitalism doomed socialism and ensured the victory of democracy. Small wonder politicians are obsessed with the economy: the Clinton campaign motto-"It's the economy stupid" -sums up a central tenet of modern life.But is it the economy? Ferguson thinks it is high time we re-examined the link-the "nexus," to use Thomas Carlyle's term-between economics and politics, in the aftermath not only of the failure of socialism but also of the apparent triumph of American-style capitalism. His central argument is that the conflicting impulses of sex, violence, and power are together more powerful than money. In particular, political events and institutions have often dominated economic development. A bold synthesis of political history and modern economic theory, Cash Nexus will transform the landscape of modern history and draw challenging and unsettling conclusions about the prospects of both capitalism and democracy.



All Customer Reviews
Average Customer Review:4 out of 5 stars
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:

4 out of 5 starsMoney and power, 2008-10-09
Ferguson writes another of his trademark power histories with a grand narrative and an attempt to scale the mighty themes.

The Cash Nexus, taken from Carlye's quote about money and political power, examines the paradigms of money and warfare in the modern world. He writes interestingly about how many modern financial institutions came about to finance warfare, and how modern insitutions of peacekeeping such as the UN can be woefully inadequate compared with the might and financial clout of sovereign nations (especially the USA).

A raft of statistical data is invoked to back up the claims made. An interesting book for anyone interested in the modern world, and how power structures have come about.


2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:

4 out of 5 starsWar as Investment, 2007-05-18
This book is a fascinating read for everyone who is interested in the application of economic theory to world history. Reviewing and rejecting economic determinist theories like marxism, the political business cycle and imperial overstretch, Ferguson advances his own argument. It is war that brought us modern finance, bureaucracy and democracy. The outcome of war cannot be predicted with accuracy, but the nation that can finance it at least costs has a comparative advantage. Ferguson skillfully applies modern expectations theory to his historical account. He argues that military hegemony can spread good institutions around the globe as happened under British rule. You can disagree with his plea for benevolent imperialism in an age in which nations want to determine their own future. Moreover, it is questionable whether war `pays', since the costs of war exceeded revenues in most cases as Ferguson points out. But, this did not stop nations and groups from waging war.


5 of 5 people found the following review helpful:

4 out of 5 starsNiall Ferguson, in his element, 2007-01-23
I originally picked up this book to see how Ferguson's economic views relate to his views of imperialism (Colossus, and Empire). What I discovered was little different than I expected; that the burden of warfare and imperialism on national treasuries in Europe actually HELPED to develop today's financial systems. This financial system (i.e. the bond market) gave these powers, such as Britain, the ability to extend their power, resulting in world supremacy. In putting forth this theory, he seems to overlook, or at least withhold, alternative ways that the financial sector developed.

With viewpoints and summaries aside, the book was a laborious read. It does, of course, cater to the reader interested in economics, but it is hardly a popular read that the average layperson would want to pick up. Yet while his economic theories - and history - are masked in complicated research and developed theories, the suggested agenda is less objective: it sends the message that overstretch is a myth, that warfare is not totally negative, and that world supremacy depends on a flexible financial apparatus. These implications, certainly, are open to debate, and as the opener to this angle of the debate, it is valuable.


16 of 16 people found the following review helpful:

2 out of 5 starsa mixed book, 2006-08-21
Niall Ferguson is a professor of political and financial history who has written other well-received, albeit controversial, books. My feeling after reading this book was rather mixed.

[..]
This, I think, is where things become more complicated than the book suggests. Did England found the Bank of England and establish the other institutions that allowed the United Kingdom to become the global hegemon in order to become a global hegemon? Or did Parliament and the Bank of England etc. arise to meet other needs, and prove far more useful than originally foreseen? I strongly believe the latter to be true: Britain, as an island nation, had no neighbors, and was an (after 1066) invasion-proof distance from France. These factors almost certainly allowed the United Kingdom to generate a merchant class far more influential than its counterparts on the continent, engage in more maritime trade, and devote less to military spending than did land-locked nations that faced war at any time. In time, this merchant class, and the practice of dividing risks and participating in syndicates to conduct foreign trade almost certainly led to the culture and institutions that led to the Bank of England. Of course, if the Bank of England and the like did not arise as much from conscious policy decisions as from circumstances, it would seem more expedient to focus on the circumstances that led to the BofE and Britain's broad and deep credit markets, rather than on arcane policy decisions.

The rest of the book is an exhaustively documented look at the relationship between the health of various states and various financial indicators, such as debt, the presence of the gold standard, unemployment and the like. Some of the ideas may be provocative to some, but are very well-founded, and well worth reading, others less so. They are, however, not presented in a focused manner, and many of them are more advanced as "working hypotheses" than exhaustively proven. I believe that case studies examining multiple variables would have been more informative than attempts to reduce complex situations to a single variable.

Somewhat jarring is that some of the Ferguson's facts are wrong: in Chapter 12 he suggests that Switzerland succumbed to the Nazi tide, three pages later we learn that the opposite happened. To emphasize the importance of bullion he goes into the details of the movie based on Ian Fleming's "Goldfinger," but gets them wrong: the idea was not to sneak off with Fort Knox's gold - a logistical impossibility - but rather to render it radioactive and hence untradeable. At least one somewhat complicated book that Ferguson endorses is so flawed that its own author has repudiated it; this shouldn't happen in a polemic whose credibility is based on the author's ability to get his facts straight.

To sum up, parts of this book are quite interesting and stimulating, other parts less so. Having read this book, I personally would not choose to read it again.


9 of 9 people found the following review helpful:

4 out of 5 starsUnderstretch or Overstretch?, 2006-05-07
Niall Ferguson has written an excellent book from a generally objective point of view full of intriguing arguments backed up by extensive statistical analysis. The part that seems to have received the most attention is his discussion of great power "overstretch" and it is the part that also caught my attention especially since I read it with the benefit of hindsight.

He wrote this book in the year 2000, just before 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq. In the last chapter of his book he argues that great powers do not fail because they are overstretched but rather because they are overly reluctant to wield their enormous power.

He says that "there is no economic argument against" a policy to establish democratic institutions where they are lacking even if "by military force" since it would not be "prohibitively costly." In particular, he mentions the desirablity to violently overthrow Saddam Hussein using the war against Germany and Japan and our subsequent successful imposition of democratic institutions on these two countries as examples in support of his thesis.

His final sentence is this: "Perhaps that is the greatest disappointment facing the world in the twenty-first century: that the leaders of the one state with the economic resouces to make the world a better place lack the guts to do it." Meaning the use of military intervention where needed.

Judging from what happened after Ferguson's book was published, someone in the future Bush administration must have read it.

When we invaded Iraq, we showed the world that we have the guts but the results have been morally and economically dismal. The invasion has certainly been and continues to be very costly and we seem to be in cul-de-sac from which there is no good way out. And Iraq is not the world. It was just one country among many in dire need of radical transformation.

One point Ferguson seems to have missed is that all countries are not like Germany and Japan.

Are our problems in Iraq because the idea of an invasion was good but the execution was incompetent; or was it a bad idea to begin with; or is it actually going well? Is this feeling of "overstretch" just an illusion?

I, for one, would certainly like to hear what the author has to say now that six years have passed.




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