Policy preferences of FOMC members as revealed by dissenting votes. (Federal Open Market Committee): An article from: Journal of Money, Credit & Banking

by Susan Belden

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This digital document is an article from Journal of Money, Credit & Banking, published by Ohio State University Press on November 1, 1989. The length of the article is 3338 words. The page length shown above is based on a typical 300-word page. The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Digital Locker immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

From the supplier: Analysis of the record of dissenting votes of Federal Open Market Committee members addresses four questions: (1) Do bank presidents vote differently than Board members? (2) Does economic uncertainty heighten dissent? (3) Does dissent differ under different chairmen? and (4) Is political influence effective? Several conclusions are drawn: Bank presidents prefer tighter monetary policy than Board members. Economic uncertainty heightens dissent. Differences in both the Chairman's ability to influence FOMC members and his background are reflected in the voting record. And, neither executive nor legislative control over monetary policy appears significant. (Printed by permission of the publisher.)

Citation Details
Title: Policy preferences of FOMC members as revealed by dissenting votes. (Federal Open Market Committee)
Author: Susan Belden
Publication: Journal of Money, Credit & Banking (Refereed)
Date: November 1, 1989
Publisher: Ohio State University Press
Volume: v21 Issue: n4 Page: p432(10)

Distributed by Thomson Gale

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