Nonprofits with distributional objectives: price discrimination and corner solutions [An article from: Journal of Public Economics]

by R. Steinberg, B.A. Weisbrod

List Price:	~~$8.95~~
Amazon Price:	$8.95 & eligible for FREE Super Saver Shipping on orders over $25.
Lowest New Price:	$8.95
Availablitiy:	Available for download now

Editorial Reviews
Product Description
This digital document is a journal article from Journal of Public Economics, published by Elsevier in . The article is delivered in HTML format and is available in your Amazon.com Media Library immediately after purchase. You can view it with any web browser.

Description:
We characterize the patterns of pricing and rationing when paternalistic nonprofit organizations (either private or governmental) care about the level and distribution of consumer surplus provided to their clients. Equilibrium depends upon marginal cost, the organization's distributional weights, exogenous income levels, and cream-skimming by competing for-profit firms. In equilibrium, some consumers pay their reservation price or a lower price above marginal cost, some pay less than marginal cost, some obtain the good for free, and some are not permitted to buy the good at any acceptable price. Comparative statics here differs from that for output or profit maximizers, with discontinuous price schedules shifting abruptly when exogenous income changes.

Price is accurate as of the date/time indicated. Prices and product availability are subject to change. Any price displayed on the Amazon website at the time of purchase will govern the sale of this product.