by Gordon Corera
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Product Description
A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology, described by a former CIA Director as "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden." A hero in Pakistan and revered as the Father of the Bomb, Khan built a global clandestine network that sold the most closely guarded nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
Here for the first time is the riveting inside story of the rise and fall of A.Q. Khan and his role in the devastating spread of nuclear technology over the last thirty years. Drawing on exclusive interviews with key players in Islamabad, London, and Washington, as well as with members of Khan's own network, BBC journalist Gordon Corera paints a truly unsettling picture of the ultimate arms bazaar. Corera reveals how Khan operated within a world of shadowy deals among rogue states and how his privileged position in Pakistan provided him with the protection to build his unique and deadly business empire. It explains why and how he was able to operate so freely for so many years. Brimming with revelations, the book provides new insight into Iran's nuclear ambitions and how close Tehran may be to the bomb.
In addition, the book contains startling new information on how the CIA and MI6 penetrated Khan's network, how the U.S. and UK ultimately broke Khan's ring, and how they persuaded Pakistan's President Musharraf to arrest a national hero. The book also provides the first detailed account of the high-wire dealings with Muammar Gadaffi, which led to Libya's renunciation of nuclear weapons and which played a key role in Khan's downfall.
The spread of nuclear weapons technology around the globe presents the greatest security challenge of our time. Shopping for Bombs presents a unique window into the challenges of stopping a new nuclear arms race, a race that A.Q. Khan himself did more than any other individual to promote.
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Average Customer Review:
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful:
 Actual Man who achived this for his country-Dr. Alam, 2008-10-04
All the world knows that Dr. A. Q. Khan (Khan) stole but incomplete diagrams & he initailly thoughts he can make bomb with few technicians but this was his Deputy Dr. G. D. Alam (Dr. Alam) who told him that you can't do this without proper manpower.
Dr. Alam is the actual man behind this achivement for Pakistan and he is the man who achived this for Pakistan (Dr. Alam died on 5th December 2000). (This is Dr. Alam once said that "History don't lie" this is true.
This is the book 1st time mentioned Dr. Alam as his deputy, which means his investigation and research is very thorough, Dr Alam is the man who negotiated with all seller throughout the world for Pakistan's bomb, but refuse to help Dr. Khan sell the technology for personal gain)
Cheers'
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful:
 Nuclear technology for sale, 2008-07-13
I found it a fascinating of how one man could become a major dealer in nuclear technology.
The lax security in the European nuclear program allowed a Pakistani engineer Khan to steal the centrifuge designs. Khan took those designs to Pakistan to help create a nuclear bomb there. Soon Khan became the head of a major nuclear organization in Pakistan. Soon the Pakistani had developed centrifuges technology that could bypass the international controls on making nuclear bombs.
Here contrary to the writer, I am not so sure from his evidence the US atomic program for peace failed as he suggested. The appeal of Khan technology to rogue countries was they could bypass the checks here. So Khan sold this technology for large sums to Iran, Libya, North Korea and maybe one more.
Part of the problem stopping Khan was finding what was happening. Then it was his prestige in Pakistan. Plus the free world's need for Pakistani support both in the cold war and the war in Afghanistan after 911 but eventually in January 2004, under world pressure Khan was arrested and put under house arrest. So finally stopping Khan, leaving us with a problem of knowing how much damage Khan did!
Now it is a few years since the book was written. Iran is still trying to make a bomb. At best, Khan would have given it a boost. The Libyan spent much money for nothing and eventually gave up on nuclear bombs, so his contribution there was useless. North Korea appears according to recent information gave up earlier on this type of uranium enrichment technology and went back to the power reactor method. Maybe he helped with the bomb design. The last unknown country, I cannot comment.
Finally I am left wondering what happened to the money the Pakistani got from these countries? Khan lived a good life but he did not take much of the money. I suspect that it went to the Pakistan's nuclear program which I find a disturbing conclusion.
Overall if you are interested in this, you will find this a fascinating read.
0 of 0 people found the following review helpful:
Outstanding!, 2007-11-12
George Tenet reportedly described A.Q. Khan as "at least as dangerous as Osama bin Laden." Corera adds that Khan has had greater impact on nuclear proliferation than any other individual - yet, his story begins simply as the right man in the right place. Trained as a metallurgist in Europe, he began work in '72 at a research lab in the Netherlands at the forefront of Europe's efforts to develop the latest centrifuge technology for nuclear fuel, providing independence from the U.S.
Next to the research lab was a plant holding thousands of tall, slender centrifuges connected by a maze of metal piping. Each machine only enriched the gas a tiny amount - thus, the need for a connected cascade. Each centrifuge consisted of 100 parts, many engineered to within /001 of a mm. and able to withstand very high speeds. One tiny mistake and the centrifuge spins out of control, often crashing into other machines and destroying the entire cascade.
Khan's first job at the research center was to translate documents for a new German-designed centrifuge - the P2. Security at the site was lax, and within three years Khan's co-worker became convinced Khan was a spy. Authorities were alerted, but according to most accounts, the CIA helped convince them just to watch Khan and remove his access to secret materials. Realizing he'd been found out, Khan returned to Pakistan, taking thousands of pages of documents and even discarded parts with him.
At about this same point in time the U.S. learned of Pakistan's intent to use fuel reprocessing (aided by France) to make a bomb. France as convinced to stop the program, leading Pakistan to instead focus on Khan's knowledge of centrifuges. (Other advantages of using centrifuges were that much less space and power were required than reprocessing or gaseous diffusion - making the program much easier to hide.)
Khan knew Pakistan lacked the manufacturing skills ("couldn't make a pin"), but he also knew who the component suppliers were for the research lab where he had worked. Thus, he utilized a network of Swiss, German, U.K., U.S., China (bomb design), North Korea (missile design), and Niger (yellowcake) suppliers. By 1987 Pakistan had the bomb. Soon after, Khan began marketing his/Pakistan's skills - North Korea, Libya, and Iran. Throughout this period and on to the present, the U.S. knew of Pakistan's activities but refrained from taking strong action because their cooperation was needed to help defeat the Russians in Afghanistan, and then after 9/11 in terror-reduction efforts.
An IAEA inspection in '03 found Iran with 160 cascaded P1-design centrifuges and evidence of uranium enriched to between 36 - 70%. Iran's original efforts began under the Shah in 1976, were known about in the U.S., and reportedly led Saddam Hussein in Iraq to press for his own program (began by purchasing a reactor from France). Iran, like its mentor, Pakistan, eventually also decided to go the centrifuge route after the U.S. pressed France to renege on an agreement to provide Iran with a fuel reprocessing (enrichment) plant. In addition, taking a lesson from Iraq's reactor being destroyed by Israel, Iran built its facilities in a dispersed, underground manner.
Currently it is not clear what Iran's strategy is. It may simply be building a large, legal stockpile of power-plant level fuel - ready to upgrade to weapons grade on short notice in only 20% of the time required starting from scratch. Or, it may have a parallel setup that is creating bomb-grade material at the present.
Pakistan's proliferation activities continued after 9/11 - however, dissidents in various countries provided information that led to finding enrichment centrifuges on a ship bound for Libya. Libya decided to renounce its program, and the information garnered from them and their suppliers helped prove to Pakistan's leaders that Khan and his associates were running amok.
A.Q. Khan has now been under house arrest in Pakistan for several years, unable to even use the telephone. Hopefully his proliferation activities have all been undone. However, his network suppliers have by now learned how valuable their offerings are, and it is also known that he also worked with those wanting to start a program in Saudi Arabia.
1 of 1 people found the following review helpful:
A top recommendation for both general-interest collections strong in terrorist studies and military holdings., 2007-02-09
A.Q. Khan was the world's leading black market dealer in nuclear technology and a hero in Pakistan: Khan was known as the Father of the Bomb and built a global network selling nuclear secrets to Iran, North Korea and Libya. It's surprising to note that this is the first book-length survey of the rise and fall of the man and his role in spreading nuclear technology. It use interviews with politicians and key members of his own network to survey not only Khan's life and influence on the spread of nuclear technology, but the methods and intentions of the rogue states who bought from him. New details on how the CIA penetrated his network and broke his ring makes for a unique and eye-opening analysis which is a top recommendation for both general-interest collections strong in terrorist studies and military holdings.
Diane C. Donovan
California Bookwatch
3 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
Nice research, though lot of it unsubstantiated, 2006-10-10
This book is an excellent piece of work on Nuclear Proliferation. Things that I would have liked to see in this book :
*) Substantiated material with actual interviews with intelligence officers. Author uses lots of qoutes from private conversations, but how did he get access to those ? That makes me question a bit the authencity of the research.
*) The book keeps on jumping back and forth, which is an excellent case to muddy the presentation. I would have liked a chronological order maintained in the book so that thought processes can be collected and processed efficiently.
Overall it is an eye-opener.
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